CLARENCE EARL GIDEON, PETITIONER, NO.
155
Vs.
H. G. COCHRAN, etc., RESPONDENT
Washington, D. C.
January 15,1963
The above – entitled
cause came on for oral argument, pursant to notice,
BEFORE:
EARL WARREN, Chief Justice of the United
States
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
THOMAS C. CLARK, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN,
JR., Associate
Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
ATHUR J. GOLDBERG, Associate Justice
PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: No. 155, Clarence Earl Gideon, petitioner,
versus
H. G. Cochran, Director, Division of
Corrections.
Mr. Fortas.
ORAL ARGUMENT BY ABE
FORTAS,
BY APPOINTMENT OF THE
COURT,
370 U.S. 932, ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER
MR. FORTAS: Mr. Chief Justice, may it
please the Court, this case is here on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the State of Florida. In issuing the writ of certiorari, this Court expressly
requested counsel to discuss the following question: Should this Court’s holding
in Betts versus Brady, 316 U.S. 455, be reconsidered?
The question, of course, is the right of accused in State criminal proceedings
to the appointment of counsel. Specifically in the present case which you have
before you, the question is an exceedingly narrow one.
The question in the present case is
whether requests being made by the accused that counsel be appointed to him, the
accused being concededly indigent, it is the duty of the State to accede to that
request and to appoint counsel for purposes of assisting the accused in the
trial of the case. In other words, the present case involves a trial, a plea of
not guilty; it involves a felony. And that is the narrow question that this case
presents.
Clarence Earl Gideon was convicted by
the State of Florida for the violation of a statute which makes it a felony,
unlawfully and feloniously, to break and enter the building of another with
intent to commit a misdemeanor. He was charged with breaking and entering the
Bay Harbor Poolroom in Panama City, Florida. And having broken and entered that
poolroom, he is charged with having extracted some wine, perhaps some
cigarettes, and a sum of money. There is no evidence in the record as to the
amount, but the amount must have been less than $100 because the statute of the
State of Florida defines petty larceny as the taking of goods or money in an
amount less than $100.
At the commencement of the trial, the
court asked Clarence Earl Gideon if he was ready to proceed; he said he was not.
He said he was not because he was without funds and without counsel; and he
asked the court to appoint counsel to represent him.
As you will see on page 2 of the
petitioner’s brief, the court replied that he could not appoint counsel to
represent a defendant in a noncapital case. Whereupon, the case proceeded to
trial, with Clarence Earl Gideon doing what he could—
THE COURT: Mr. Fortas, could you excuse
me.
MR. FORTAS —doing what he could to
defend himself. Yes, Mr. Justice?
THE COURT: There is some question
whether or not we have before us the trial transcript. But it really doesn’t
make any difference, does it, because these were the allegations of his habeas
corpus—
MR. FORTAS That’s
correct.
THE COURT: -application in the State of
Florida. They don’t— there’s no variance between them and this copy—
MR. FORTAS No, that’s correct. You will
also see on page 2 of petitioner’s brief in the footnote that the State of
Florida concedes that the allegations in the habeas corpus petition are true:
namely, that petitioner was without funds and without an attorney at the time of
trial; that he requested the appointment of counsel and that the trial court
failed to appoint counsel. You will see that quoted on page 2 of our
brief.
THE COURT: So that we have the same
case here, whether the transcript is before us or not, don’t
we?
MR. FORTAS That is, that is my view,
yes. I must say, Your Honor, that it was at my request. The transcript was not
before the Supreme Court of Florida. I was coming to that in a
moment.
After Gideon—and let
me state it this way: After Gideon was convicted and sentenced, several months
later he sent a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of the
State of Florida—which appears in this transcript. That petition cited no
special circumstances; it made the bald, bare claim that Gideon was entitled to
counsel as a constitutional matter and that the trial court refused to appoint
counsel for him. And on that basis, Gideon asked that he be released. The
Supreme Court—there were no supporting affidavits, there was no supporting
information, there was no supporting trial transcript. Gideon—the Supreme Court
of Florida denied the writ and dismissed the petition; and they dismissed it
without opinion without hearing or without reference for the taking of testimony
whatever. And it’s from that denial that the case is here on Gideon’s
application, per se, for a writ of
certiorari. Accordingly, the record before the Supreme Court of Florida consists
of nothing except Gideon’s old application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
After the case came to
this Court and this Court granted the writ of certiorari, I, as counsel for Mr.
Gideon, requested the Clerk of this Court to ask the Florida trial court to
certify the transcript here. I did that because I thought that the transcript
should be here, that the Court should be, this Court should be completely
informed as to what had happened.
The attorney general
of Florida filed a motion to deny my request that the transcript be sent to this
Court. That motion was—the attorney general’s opposition was turned down by this
Court; my motion was granted, and the transcript was sent up from the trial
court directly to this Court. The attorney general of Florida now takes the
position that the transcript is not properly before this Court. We disagree, but
for reasons that I shall come to, we do not believe that makes any difference,
whether the transcript is here or not. We believe that Betts against Brady is properly raised in this case
and must unavoidably be considered. The reason for that is that I see no basis,
or I do not see an adequate basis for an argument that special
circumstances exist in this case. And I will come to that in more length in a
moment.
Let me say this, if
the Court please: If you will look at this transcript of the record, perhaps you
will share my feeling, which is a feeling of despondency. This record does not
indicate that Clarence Earl Gideon is a man of inferior natural talents. This
record does not indicate that Clarence Earl Gideon is a moron or a person of low
intelligence. This record does not indicate that the judge of the trial court in
the State of Florida, or that the prosecuting attorney in the State of Florida,
was derelict in his duty. On the contrary, it indicates that they tried to help
Gideon. But to me, if the Court please, this record indicates the basic
difficulty with Betts against Brady. And the basic difficulty with Betts against Brady is that no man, certainly no
layman, can conduct a trial in his own defense so that the trial is a fair
trial.
THE COURT: Well, Betts and Brady did not proceed on that basis; it
did not deny the obvious. Obviously, a man who is not represented is not as,
hasn’t had as good a shake in court as the man who is represented. Betts and Brady didn’t go on any such basis as
that.
MR. FORTAS: Are you
suggesting, Mr. Justice Harlan—which I believe to be the case—that the real
basis for Betts against Brady is the following: That a man does
not get a fair trial if he is not represented by a lawyer, but that the demands
of federalism overweigh the absence of a fair trial?
THE COURT: That’s what
I understood the basis of Betts and
Brady to be,
yes.
MR. FORTAS: I read it
as indicating both; but of course, we must remember in reading Betts against Brady that Betts against Brady was—involved a trial before a very
distinguished jurist, Judge Bond of Maryland, and it did not involve a jury
trial. But it’s interesting, after all these years, Mr. Justice Harlan, to read
the recent article by Professor Kamisar of the University of Minnesota in which
even in Betts against Brady, even in that case, tried to a
judge alone and not to a jury, and tried before a very distinguished judge, the
record, the transcript of record, as Professor Kamisar shows, is replete with
error. And the case that he makes is an entirely convincing case to me, just as
in Gideon’s case. There is error in this transcript; there’s error in most
criminal trials, I think we all know it, even when lawyers are present. There’s
error in this transcript. But I suggested in my brief, and I hope it’s not a
gross overstatement, that to say that this transcript distinguishes this case
from the run of criminal trials is like trying to distinguish between Tweedle
Dum and Tweedle Dee. And I believe that. I believe that this case dramatically
illustrates the point that you cannot have a fair trial without counsel. Indeed,
I believe that the right way to look at this, if I may put it that way, is that
a court, a criminal court is not properly constituted—and this has been said in
some of your own opinions—under our adversary system of law, unless there is a
judge and unless there is a counsel for the prosecution and unless there is a
counsel for the defense. Without that, how can a civilized nation pretend that
it is having a fair trial, under our adversary system, which means that counsel
for the State will do his best within the limits of fairness and honor and
decency to present the case for the State, and counsel for the defense will do
his best, similarly, to present the best case possible for the defendant, and
from that clash there will emerge the truth. That is our concept, and how can we
say, how can it be suggested that a court is properly constituted, that a trial
is fair, unless those conditions exist.
Someone
said—
THE COURT: Well, it
isn’t quite so simple as that, because there are concepts in the Federal system
apart from the Sixth Amendment. We would consider that a man in a felony case
hadn’t had a fair shake if he wasn’t tried before a jury. And I suppose the
State could do away with the jury trial and you wouldn’t say this trial was
inherently unfair, would you?
MR. FORTAS: That’s
right, and that’s what I want to get to, Mr. Justice.
THE COURT: I think
you’d have to argue this on the basis of Federalism.
MR. FORTAS: I
appreciate that, and I am happy if we can clear the debris, if I may say so, so
we can understand exactly what is at issue here. And I just want to say and to
nail this, if I may, that we are not and we cannot, as I think this colloquy has
disclosed, Mr. Justice Harlan, proceed on the assumption that there is any such
thing as a fair criminal trial where the defendant is not represented by
counsel.
And now I would like to get to the
question of federalism.
THE COURT: Well, this
federalism that Justice Harlan mentions implicit, I gather, in all that we have
written. I believe I have read all of them; have written some of them. I don’t
know if anyone has—any member of this Court has come out and said in so many
terms it’s the constitutional right of a State to provide a system whereby
people get unfair trials.
MR. FORTAS: Well, Mr.
Justice Douglas—
THE COURT: I don’t
believe that suggested that; I don’t suppose—
THE COURT: I thought
that’s what we were talking about, isn’t it.
MR. FORTAS: Well, Mr. Justice Douglas,
I—
THE COURT: I mean, if a person can’t
have a fair trial without a lawyer, and this is a problem of federalism, you
come down to how a State has a constitutional right to provide a system that
perpetuates unfair trials.
MR. FORTAS: Mr.
Justice Douglas, it seems to me that perhaps he propo—I would state the
proposition this way—and I do believe that it is a proposition that proves
itself: That is to say, the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fair trial. You
cannot have a fair trial unless the defendant has counsel. Now, the Q.E.D. to me
is so obvious that I can’t escape from it, and I can’t escape from it by saying
that the Q.E.D. does not follow because of a principle of federalism. We start
with the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fair trial, and we
say that the defendant in criminal proceeding cannot get a fair trial unless he
has counsel, and it seems to me to follow without any possible escape hatch that
he’s got to have a fair trial, but I think—I may be wrong about this, but I do
believe that in some of this Court’s decisions there has been a tendency from
time to time, because of the pull of federalism, to forget, to forget the
realities of what happens downstairs, of what happens to these poor, miserable,
indigent people when they are arrested and they are brought into the jail and
they are questioned and later on they are brought in these strange and awesome
circumstances before a magistrate, and then later on they are brought before a
court; and there, Clarence Earl Gideon, defend yourself. Apply the doctrine of
Mapp against Ohio; construe this statute of the State
of Florida which says that breaking and entering with intent to commit a
misdemeanor is a felony. You should know, Clarence Earl Gideon, that the State
of Florida, the Supreme Court of the State of Florida, has construed this
statute and it has made available to you various defenses. Well, then, how can
Clarence Earl Gideon do it?
I was reminded the
other day as I was pondering this case about Clarence Darrow’s trial. The Court
will remember that Clarence Darrow was accused and subsequently acquitted of
attempting to bribe jurors and subordination of perjury. And I looked at Irving
Stone’s book; Irving Stone’s book says that the first thing that Clarence Darrow
realized was that he had to have a lawyer. Here was a man who by our folklore,
anyway, and I think perhaps really was our greatest criminal lawyer, he needed a
lawyer. He got a lawyer. He was eventually acquitted.
But I think that in
some of the Court’s opinions, if I may say so, Mr. Justice Harlan, this element,
this failure to remember what happens downstairs, has crept in. Not because of
an insensitivity of the judges but because of the understandable pull of
the sensitivity about the States’ old jurisdiction. And that’s why I want to
analyze that. I don’t think that it stands the test of logic, and I don’t think
that the argument of federalism here is either correct or soundly founded or
stands the test of experience, and that’s what I want to come
to.
Now, first—
THE COURT: “Understandable sensitivity”
to describe a basic principle of our Government doesn’t seem to me to be a very
happy expression.
MR. FORTAS: Well, I’m
sorry, sir. I meant that a regard, which I myself share, for the principles of
federalism. But I believe that those principles are misapplied here. First, they
are misapplied, if I may respectfully say so, when they are used for the purpose
of negating a Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. Secondly, they are
misapplied here because a true regard, in my judgment, Mr. Justice Harlan, for
federalism here means that this Court will lay down a principle, will establish
a principle, and that this Court will not exercise the kind of minute, detailed,
ex post facto supervision over State
court trials that you have been exercising for these past years and which, in my
opinion, is the most corrosive possible way to administer our Federal-State
system. And that, it is—I should like to restate that very simply and very
plainly, Your Honors: I believe that Betts against Brady does not incorporate a proper
regard for federalism. I believe that Betts against Brady, laying down as it does the
principle of case-by-case supervision by the Federal courts of State criminal
proceedings, is antithetical to federalism. Federalism requires, in my judgment,
if Your Honors please, that the Federal courts should refrain so far as possible
from intervention in State criminal proceedings. And certainly, where
intervention is necessary because of a constitutional principle, that that
intervention should be exercised in the least corrosive, the least abrasive
fashion possible.
Now, let’s take a look
at that.
In Betts against Brady, we have to start back with that
magnificent opinion, magnificent decision and opinion of this Court written
by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell
against Alabama, in the
Scottsboro case, when Mr. Justice Sutherland’s opinion makes it perfectly clear
that the correct principle in capital cases is that a State court cannot conduct
a criminal proceeding without providing counsel for the accused. Now, this Court
has said that that is a flat rule; that in capital cases this Court does not
stop to inquire whether there are special circumstances: counsel must be
appointed for the accused. That was in 1932.
In 1938, along came Johnson against Zerbst, in which this Court construed
the Sixth Amendment to require the appointment of counsel for indigent accused
in all Federal criminal proceedings.
Then, in 1942, Betts against Brady came to this Court. And in Betts against Brady, this Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Roberts held that the Fourteenth Amendment would not be construed to
require that the States appoint counsel for the accused in all criminal cases
where the accused is not able to afford counsel, but that counsel would be
required as part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of a fair trial only
when there were special circumstances or, to quote the Court’s words, “only
where there has been a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal
sense of justice,” which, according to the Court, required something more than
the mere absence of counsel.
All right, what has
happened in the years since Betts
against Brady? I have read, I
think—I’m sure I have read all of the cases that have come to this Court; I’ve
read a great many of the State cases and the lower Federal court cases, as many
as I could find. It is a fascinating inquiry, a fascinating inquiry. In the
brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union here, which is represented by
my brother Mr. Rankin, they have examined 139 State cases, reported cases. They
say that they have found only 11 cases in which the State apellate courts found
special circumstances under Betts
against Brady. Contrast that with
what’s happened in this Court. Take a look, as—I beg your pardon. As I have read
the opinions of this Court, I hope I may be forgiven for saying that my heart
has been full of compassion for the judges who during these years have had to
review and pass on these cases. Most of the time, of course, this Court has said
there are special circumstances. Sometimes a majority of this Court, usually a
bare majority, has found that there were not special
circumstances.
THE COURT: How long
has it been since we’ve failed to find special circumstances? I think I’m right
in saying that in the four and a half terms that I’ve been here, we’ve always
found special circumstances in any case—
MR. FORTAS: I think
you’re right, sir. I’d like to check this, but I believe the last case in which
you failed to find special circumstances was—
THE COURT: One of
those Michigan cases?
MR. FORTAS: It was Quicksall, I
think.
THE COURT: Well, it’s not very
important, but I think I’m right in the comment I made.
MR. FORTAS: Yes,
sir.
THE COURT: In my
recollection.
MR. FORTAS: Now, of
course this is wrong, and it’s wrong as a matter of federalism, because what
happens is the following. Let’s take a look at it. A defendant is arraigned. How
can a judge, looking at the defendant, decide whether there are special
circumstances in his case? Does the judge look at this defendant and say: You
look stupid; you look as if you’re a moron. Does he have a mental examination of
him at the time? Does the judge, does the judge or the magistrate before whom
these defendants are arraigned on a typical day in court take a look at the
crimes with which they are charged and say: Now this one involves complicated
questions of intent, so I think that at the trial you’re going to need a
counsel. Now your case, the crime that you’re charged with doesn’t look to me to
be so complicated, so I don’t think you’re going to need counsel. Now that’s at
arraignment; then you go to trial and the defendant, the accused man has pleaded
not guilty. And the judge that’s sitting on the bench, he’s hearing a lot of
these cases. How is he going to decide at the beginning of the case whether
there are special circumstances within the criteria laid down by this Court? The
interesting thing, too, according to the study made by the American Civil
Liberties Union, they have not encountered a single case in the State courts in
which the trial has been stopped in midstream and the court has said: There are
special circumstances here and you’d better have a lawyer, because it looks to
me that you’re not brighter than Clarence Darrow, or you’re a moron and you
can’t really defend yourself. You just don’t correctly understand the hearsay
rule and I’m going to appoint you counsel. The whole point is just totally
unadministerable. [Inaudible]’
THE COURT: Practically
all the States have recognized that’s so.
MR. FORTAS: Yes, sir,
and there are 37 states now—
THE COURT: And they’ve
done that under a line of decisions in this Court which, at least so far, would
have permitted an opposite conclusion.
MR. FORTAS: Well, I
don’t believe they’ve done it so much under the decisions of this Court, Mr.
Justice Harlan, I’m sorry to say. I believe that they have done it because of a
growing conscience and growing awareness on the part of the Bar, stimulated by
the opinions of this Court. But the decisions of this Court—and this is
precisely my plea, here—the decisions of this Court are still struggling with
this impossible question of: Do special circumstances exist in this case or
don’t they? Whereas the Bar and the States are far beyond that
point.
No. There is a brief
amicus here, a remarkable document,
filed by the attorneys general of 22 States urging this Court to overrule Betts against Brady. It is filed here; I am proud of
our country that we have this. It was not solicited by counsel for Cochran or by
counsel for Gideon or anybody associated with him, and I am proud that it is
here. It is a fine document. If you will look at that document at page—I don’t
find it here— [Inaudible].
MR. FORTAS: All right; thank you. The
attorneys general point out to this Court that the rule of Betts against Brady is an unadministrable rule. I call
your attention to page 17, at the bottom of the page—
THE COURT: What brief is
that?
MR. FORTAS: That is
this brown brief, Mr. Justice Black, brief for the State governments, amici curiae.
At the bottom of page 17, it says: “But
it is difficult to comprehend how, as a practical matter, a trial judge can do
this”—that is, to apply Betts against
Brady—”with the degree of consistency presupposed
by a judicial determination, placing the onus of such decisions upon him. In the
first place, in a felony case, it is highly unlikely that there is one trial
judge as such; different judges may preside at the arraignment, at the grand
jury session, possibly at pretrial motions, if any, and at the trial itself. How
can the judge in the arraignment session anticipate what is to come up in trial?
How is the trial judge to know what crucial matters transpired at the
arraignment which thenceforth require counsel?” And so on.
Now, if the Court please, there’s one
aspect of this brief amicus curiae to
which I want to call your particular attention. There are three States whose
attorneys general have subscribed to this which do not by law or court rules, so
far as we can find out, require the appointment of counsel in all felony cases.
Those three States are Hawaii, Maine and Rhode Island.
THE COURT: I thought
Colorado was—[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: Colorado
has recently adopted a rule of court—
THE COURT:
Oh.
MR. FORTAS: That is cited—
THE COURT: I see Colorado on both
lists, and that’s the reason I wondered—
MR. FORTAS: That is cited in our—
THE COURT: —since Colorado is one of
the 22 here.
MR. FORTAS: Yes; that’s cited in our
brief.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: I beg your pardon,
sir?
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: That’s correct; yes, sir. I
don’t know the circumstances, Mr. Justice Black.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: That’s
right.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: Yes,
sir.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: That’s
correct, yes, sir.
Sir, I believe the
fact of the matter is this: I think that we can confidently predict, we can
confidently say, that overruling Betts
against Brady at this time is
acting in accordance with the common opinion of those citizens of our country
who are qualified to have an opinion. That’s not always the case with respect to
great constitutional changes. I think with respect to this one that is the case,
and that—you will remember that in Betts
against Brady, this Court placed
some emphasis upon the fact that at the time less than a majority of the States,
as I remember, required the appointment of counsel. That is no longer true in
these—
THE COURT: Yes, I just
looked at it. The appendix to the dissenting opinion in Betts against Brady indicated that some 35 States
required the appointment of counsel at that time, and I wondered if there had
been so little development since.
MR. FORTAS: No, I
don’t—the fact of the matter is—I’ll find that in just a minute—
THE COURT: Well, don’t
tarry now, you can—
MR. FORTAS: That at
the time of Betts against Brady there were less than a majority of
the States that required it by statute or court rule. Now, I should say that
presently, in addition to the 37 States that require the appointment of counsel
for indigents by statute or court rule, a recent study, a very careful study, by
Professor Kamisar shows that there are eight States that require, that do
appoint counsel when requested. That makes a total of 45 States that appoint counsel either by
statute, court rule or by practice; and it really leaves only five States. And
of those five States—those five States are Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North
Carolina and South Carolina. And even in Florida, from which four of this
Court’s last eight cases have come, there is a situation that is worth notice.
In Florida there is a statute providing for a public defender that functions in
the four largest counties of Florida, and I’m sure you’ll hear more about that
from my brother representing the State.
So that my point here
is that we may be comforted in this constitutional moment by the fact, as it
clearly is, that what we are doing represents a deliberate change after 20
years, after 20 years of experience; and it represents a change that clearly has
the overwhelming support of the Bench and the Bar and even of the States
themselves.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: This case,
of course, narrowly presents the question of the appointment after time of
trial, and it presents, narrowly presents the question of a felon. In my own
view, I believe that the requirement that counsel should be appointed for
indigents in State criminal proceedings should be co-extensive with the
proposition that persons who are able to hire counsel, to employ counsel, have a
right, a legally protected right, a constitutional right, to utilize the
services of such counsel.
Now, we all know that the scope of the
latter principle is not entirely clear. There are some decisions of this Court,
there are many aspects of the problem where it has not been
decided.
Now, let me cut back on that, if I
may.
In the literature, there seems to be
clear agreements that the right to counsel should attach not later than the time
of arraignment. And this brief of the 22 attorneys general reiterates that
point. In other words, that the latest point is the time of
arraignment.
THE COURT: Of course, that very word
has so many different meanings in the different States—
MR. FORTAS: It does; that’s correct.
THE COURT: —and that’s the trouble with
verbalizing any test. Arraignment in some States is quite a different process
from what it is in other States.
MR. FORTAS: Yes,
sir.
My own view, Mr. Justice Stewart, is
that there is a right to counsel as soon as practicable after
arrest.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: No, sir,
we do not. I was responding to Mr. Justice Goldberg’s inquiry. You certainly do
not have to pass on it here.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: There are
some just in the District of Columbia of petty offenses which probably don’t
require appointment of counsel. With respect to the question of juries, under
the Sixth Amendment, this Court, in a case that we have cited in our brief
coming up from the District of Columbia, held that the constitutional
requirement of the Sixth Amendment with respect to jury trial did not apply to
petty offense, which in that case involved an offense punishable by imprisonment
up to 90 days, as I remember it.
THE COURT: [Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: I beg your
pardon?
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: Yes, sir,
but you will recall that in the Sixth Amendment that language runs together,
right to jury and right to counsel.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: I don’t
recall one; I don’t recall a decision of this Court on that subject. But it
does—there is this case involving jury, the right to jury. And if you’d like me
to continue, Mr. Justice Goldberg, I would—so far as I’m concerned, I would say
that the right to counsel attaches as soon as practicable after the arrest, just
as I believe that a person who can retain counsel should have a recognized right
to consult counsel shortly after arrest. Here we have a problem relating to Crooker against California.
Now, as to the extent on the other end,
this Court has held that the States must supply transcripts to indigents for
purposes of enabling the indigents to perfect their appeal. I believe that the
right to counsel also attaches for the purposes of perfecting appeal and for the
appeal. The decisions of this Court have not, as I read them, gone quite that
far, although there is language indicating that.
Now, as to the type of crime—the Sixth
Amendment, of course, speaks in terms of criminal prosecutions. The question—
there is a consensus, I believe, that the right of counsel should be recognized
in felony cases—I’m talking now about the States— and that is the provision,
that is the attitude of the 22 attorneys general.
THE COURT: Does that
word have a common meaning in all the 50 States?
MR. FORTAS: It does not. It has—there
is an area in which the word is very fuzzy—
THE COURT: Well, I know in my own
State, Mr. Fortas, we don’t recognize the felony. High misdemeanors or
misdemeanors—
MR. FORTAS: Yes, sir. And then—that’s
correct. Even the word “misdemeanor” is a fuzzy word which does not have a
common meaning. My own view about this, again, is that the right should attach
on a much broader basis, and that it should attach to all except petty offenses.
And I think this Court’s opinion in the District of Columbia case points the way
to handle that particular problem.
THE COURT: Well, there again, though,
how do you measure petty offense? For example, I know before I left New Jersey
we downgraded a number of former misdemeanors to something we called “disorderly
person offenses” –
MR. FORTAS: Yes.
THE COURT: —petty offenses; the notion
being that in that way, no requirement of jury trial for that. But conviction
for some of those can bring a jail sentence up to a year, and a fine, as I
remember it now, up to $1,000. Is that a petty offense?
MR. FORTAS: Mr.
Justice Brennan, I’d certainly pay no attention to the nomenclature adopted by
the States; you can’t, because the words mean so many different things in the
States. But fortunately, in times of stress such as this, when you are asked to
confront a problem of this sort, we lawyers can point to the fact that a
straight line can be drawn in many ways, and a line can be drawn by a series of
dots represented by individual decisions of this Court.
THE COURT: Of course, that’s just what
you’re asking us not to do; that becomes more of this ad hoc and ex post facto
situation.
MR. FORTAS: No,
because what we’re really talking about, Mr. Justice Stewart, is the extremes of
this problem. Now a good many of the States—I believe it’s over 20; one list
shows 20, one list shows 21—a good many of the States that require the
appointment of counsel to indigents include misdemeanors or their statutes are
broad enough so that they indicate that they include misdemeanors under the laws
of the particular States.
THE COURT: Well, tell me, Mr. Fortas,
would there by anything in trying to measure the line, if a line must be drawn,
based on the confinement which conviction might bring?
MR. FORTAS: Well, that would be—my own
view about that, Mr. Justice Brennan, is that one day’s confinement is
enough.
THE COURT: You
do?
MR. FORTAS: And I really believe, if I
may put it this way, I really believe that the difficulties, technical
difficulties, which we can envision here are more fancied than real. And I think
our experience in the District of Columbia with our public defender here
indicates that; in other words, that when a State goes about this job, as your
State of California has so well done, Mr. Chief Justice, and as I hope we’re
doing in the District of Columbia, what it does is to set up a system by which
persons, when they are arrested, without nice regard to whether, to the extent
of punishment or the classification of the crime, those persons are told that
they go and see the public defender or that they can have a lawyer appointed for
them. And the system works and the difficulties are much greater when we sit
here and apply our minds to the problem than those difficulties are when we
really create a mechanism for handling them.
THE COURT: How about
the traffic violation? A person who can afford a lawyer is entitled, so far as I
know, in every State, to hire a lawyer for traffic
violations.
MR. FORTAS: I see no
real difficulty, Mr. Justice, in saying to—
THE COURT: Most of
them don’t.
MR. FORTAS: —people
for a traffic, when they’re arrested for a traffic violation, if you want to see
the public defender, he’s in room 102, and to assign a public defender to
anybody who wants him. It’ll really work, it’ll work; it sounds crazy, perhaps,
but it works; it’ll work, I’m sure it will.
THE COURT: Suppose you
don’t have one?
MR. FORTAS: Well,
I—more and more States, Mr. Justice Clark, are building orderly systems and, of
course, one of the great functions that this Court performs by announcing the
law and clarifying the principles of law is to provide an impetus to the States
to erect such systems. But there are many systems that are now available: there
is the public defender system; there is the voluntary legal aid system; there is
a system of assignment; there is a system that is in vogue here in the District
and, I believe, in Massachusetts, which is very promising, indeed, of using law
students working under the supervision of experienced members of the Bar for
handling many offenses.
THE COURT: Well, that
might be all right, but I just wonder if the Legal Aid would want to take on a
traffic [Inaudible] defense—
MR. FORTAS: Well,
again—
THE COURT: They have
so many felons already, I’m just wondering.
MR. FORTAS: Again, Mr.
Justice Clark, I think that most people involved in a traffic offense really
would be sort of the, if I may use a vulgarism, the “oddball” who’s involved in
a minor traffic offense who will say that he wants a lawyer; but if he’s got a
real problem, if a person involved in a traffic offense has a real problem and a
real defense and really thinks he should have a lawyer: Why
not?
THE COURT: Mr. Fortas,
I want to ask you a question you can answer when I get back. I attached to my
dissent in Betts versus Brady a study made after much hard work
which I believed then and believe now was accurate, which said this: States
which require that indigent defendants in noncapital as well as capital criminal
cases be provided with counsel by request, I stated there were 35. What I would like to know is if there
are only 35 now, have some of those
before Betts versus Brady gone back to the Betts versus Brady ruling, or what has
happened?
MR. FORTAS: Yes,
sir.
THE COURT: We’ll
recess now.
[Whereupon a recess was
taken.]
AFTERNOON
SESSION
MR. FORTAS: I would just like briefly
to address myself to Mr. Justice Black’s question, and then reserve the balance
of my time.
Mr. Justice Black, I do not believe
that there has been any retrogression at all in any of the States. There is a
difference of opinion as to some of the statutes and cases that you cite.
Research in this field is very difficult and there are differences of opinion. I
believe that in Professor Kamisar’s article, which has just been published in
the Chicago Law Review, a companion piece in the Michigan Law Review, there is a
discussion of your footnote and some criticism of some of the
citations.
THE COURT: To the State
cases?
MR. FORTAS: Yes,
sir.
Now actually, here is the position, as
well as I understand it: In Betts
against Brady, in the majority
opinion, in the Court’s opinion, the following is stated: “In the great majority
of the States, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their
representatives and their courts, that appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right essential to a fair trial. And in the majority opinion there
are citations and analyses. Now, in your own opinion, Mr. Justice Black, on page
477, footnote 2, I think it is, you say: In 35 States there is some clear legal
requirement or an established practice.
THE COURT: That’s
right.
MR. FORTAS: Now, could we just hold
that a minute? The intervening point that I want to make is that in 1961, in McNeal against Culver, Mr. Justice Douglas appended a
list of 35 States which were, had
such provisions by constitution, statute, court rule or judicial decision. That
was in 35 States in 1961, which shows the growth in the number. Now, since the
list compiled by Mr. Justice Douglas, there have been two others, Colorado and
Michigan—You’ll find that on page 29 of our brief—which makes 37 States that by
constitution, court rule, statute, or judicial decision make the appointment of
counsel for indigents in State criminal prosecutions, at least in felony cases,
compulsory. Now, in addition—
THE COURT: And my figure was limited to
felony or penitentiary offenses.
MR. FORTAS: Some of them are; there are
about 20 or more that include misdemeanors, of those
statutes.
Now, in addition to
those 37, there are eight States which have a practice, a general practice—not
invariable, but a general practice—of appointing counsel in State felony
prosecutions. They are listed in our brief. That would bring it up to a total of
45.
Of the remaining five,
as I pointed out in my argument— Florida, for example, by statute and apparently
by practice; by statute in the case of two counties and by practice in the case
of two others—has a public defender system. And a recent study made by the
American Bar Association Foundation of the workings of that system in those
selected counties in Florida shows that the public defender system is
extensively utilized.
THE COURT: Could I ask you one
question? As I understood it, you said in answer to Mr. Justice Stewart as to
how far—whether you would draw the line at any point in appointment of counsel
if Betts against Brady were overruled—and I understood
you to say that you’d make the right as to types of cases co-extensive with
cases in which the right to counsel of your own selection would be a
constitutional requirement.
MR. FORTAS: Yes,
sir.
THE COURT: Well, is there any type of
case where a State could deny a man the right to be represented by counsel of
his own choice?
MR. FORTAS: In my opinion, there is
not, Your Honor, but I am concerned about—
THE COURT: I wouldn’t have thought so.
Even in civil cases, I don’t think a State could do that.
MR. FORTAS I am concerned about this
Court’s decision in Crooker against
California, which was a five-to-four
decision. I was asked for my own view, and in my own view—and I hope I’m not
impertinent in saying that I do not agree with this Court’s ruling in Crooker—
THE COURT: That’s a different question
from the one I was putting to you. That relates to the time of appointment, time
of the right to counsel. I’m asking you as to whether you can draw a distinction
between felony cases, misdemeanor cases, traffic cases or, for that matter,
civil cases, if, as you say, you would make the right co-extensive with the
right to counsel of your own choice.
MR. FORTAS: I was speaking only of
criminal cases, Your Honor; I was not speaking of civil cases. I know that there
are some people, but very few, so far as I know, who argue for the right in
civil cases. I do not argue for that right in civil cases, at least the broad
category, what we think of as civil cases. There can be a case called a civil
case in which the State is a party. I myself, Your Honor, believe that that is
the significant criterion: whether the State is in an adversary capacity in the
particular situation. But that’s another problem. And I am not arguing the civil
cases here, whatever; no, sir.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: No, I would not use that
terminology. I believe that some of the scholars recently are using the
terminology of “absorption,” rather than “incorporation.” That is to say that
from time to time it becomes clear that in the Fourteenth Amendment they have
been absorbed—certain aspects of the Sixth Amendment. But I do believe that—
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: Sir?
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: Well, I don’t like any of
those words.
THE COURT: Was that the language used
by Justice Cardozo?
MR. FORTAS: It was; that is correct.
And it’s being used a great deal these days in the spate of literature on the
subject.
THE COURT: But in
telling us your thoughts as to the scope of this right, are you—just as a matter
of technique—are you relying now on equal protection, the equal protection
clause?
MR. FORTAS: I think
that the equal protection clause teaches us something here. That is to say, you
can say that equal protection means that the indigents in a situation where the
State is an adversary, a criminal procedure, that the equal protection clause
requires that the poor shall not be subject to a disability to which the rich
are not subject.
THE COURT: You are
arguing equal protection rather than the due process
clause?
MR. FORTAS: That is
equal protection. So far as I’m concerned, Your Honor, I reached the result—
THE COURT: Either
one?
MR. FORTAS: —through
the due process clause standing alone, and I also get comfort from the equal
protection clause. But I believe the equal protection clause reaches only a
phase of this problem, and the due process clause reaches it in its entirety and
is self-sufficient.
THE COURT: Do any of
the States that now require counsel, require counsel in criminal traffic
cases?
MR. FORTAS: Some of
the States, Mr. Justice Clark, require it in misdemeanors; and whether any of
those States make a distinction between misdemeanors and types of traffic cases,
I don’t know.
THE COURT: Most of the
States are felonies or penitentiary sentences or some such phrase as that,
aren’t they?
MR. FORTAS: Well,
let’s see; it doesn’t split quite that way, because there are about 20 States,
at least 20 States, in which the language used seems to indicate in varying
degrees the inclusion of misdemeanors; and we’re talking about 37 States in all
where this rule has been established in a statutory or constitutional form. But
Mr. Justice Clark, getting this thing fined down with respect to the individual
States is a very difficult job of research. Professor Kamisar probably has done
the best job that’s been done to date in his two articles, one in Chicago and
one that I don’t believe we cite, that is in the forthcoming Michigan Law
Review. He sent us a copy of the galley proof. But it’s very difficult to know
precisely what the situation is in each State.
THE COURT: Am I to
understand that you think the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee or the Constitution’s
guarantee of the right to counsel has nothing to do with this? It’s solely due
to due process?
MR. FORTAS: Your
Honor—
THE COURT: Do I
understand that you lay aside the Federal guarantee of the right to counsel?
MR. FORTAS: No, sir, I
certainly do not lay it aside, and you’ll see in our brief that we argue it not,
Mr. Justice Black, in terms of the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates with respect to the States the provision of the Bill of Rights; we
don’t—
THE COURT: Well, with
reference to what, then?
MR. FORTAS:
Sir?
THE COURT: How does
the Fourteenth Amendment do it?
MR. FORTAS: Fourteenth
Amendment? Mr. Justice Black, I like that argument that you have so eloquently
made time and time again—
[Laughter]
MR. FORTAS: I can’t make it to this
Court as an advocate because this Court’s turned it down so many
times.
[Laughter]
MR. FORTAS: I hope and pray that you
will never cease contending for it.
THE COURT: I’m inclined to think the
Court’s accepted it in a number—
MR. FORTAS: In a
number of particulars—
THE COURT: In a
particular one, yes.
MR. FORTAS: And this is a particular,
and frankly, I think there are alternative forms of language that the Court can
use and I’m in favor of the Court’s using the broadest possible—
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. FORTAS: You seem to know me well,
Mr. Justice Brennan.
THE COURT: Mr. Fortas, you haven’t had
an opportunity to sum up your argument because of all of our questions. You may
have five minutes at the conclusion to do that—
MR. FORTAS: Thank
you.
THE COURT: —and the
State may have 5 extra minutes, too,
if it wishes to—
MR. FORTAS: Thank you,
sir.
THE COURT: —for the
same purpose. Mr. Rankin.
ORAL ARGUMENT BY J. LEE
RANKIN,
BY SPECIAL LEAVE OF COURT, ON
BEHALF
OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION
MR. RANKIN: Mr. Chief
Justice, may it please the Court, the amici urge the Court to reconsider Betts against Brady and overrule it. We have carefully
examined the Federal question and we do think that is the heart of the problem.
But in the examination of that question, we think you have to start back with
the Fourteenth Amendment and the question of due process and equal protection.
And we think that the error in Betts
against Brady is the basic
assumption that you can have a fair trial in the ordinary circumstances where
you do not have special circumstances without a lawyer. There is where we think
the error in Betts against Brady is, and that’s where it needs to
be corrected.
Now it’s our position that the judges
of this country, including this Court and all the other judges, have a special
responsibility concerning this problem. And right along with that is the
responsibility of lawyers, because the layman doesn’t know this problem like we
do. This is the judges’ and the lawyers’ problem. We deal with the intricate
questions. We’re here before this Bench from time to time with them. All that
was involved, for instance, in Mapp
against Ohio; the coerced
confession; the question of whether or not there has been discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury or petit jury; the right to cross-examination. And
then Betts against Brady assumes that the layman knows
enough to present those arguments on his own behalf.
Now in most cases, we should be the
ones, we of the Bar at least, and I think the courts know it just as well as we
do because they observe it day by day. It just isn’t true that the layman knows
those rules of law, and if he does happen to hear about them, he doesn’t know
how to express them and represent himself. Well, that’s what’s wrong with Betts against Brady and it is time, long passed, that
our profession should stand up and say: We know because of our day-by-day
experience that the ordinary layman can’t get a fair trial, either in the
Federal courts where it’s corrected or in the State courts of this country where
he represents himself.
Just imagine all of the rules that the
lawyer has to deal with to represent a client properly, from the moment he is
first consulted, in the ordinary criminal case, and then imagine the layman
trying to follow that track: find the cases, find the distinctions between one
case and another, and applying them. Now, it would be bad enough for us of the
profession to say that you could have a fair trial under those circumstances,
knowing what we do with regard to the ordinary layman without counsel, but we
also know that on the other side of the case, whether it’s the Government of the
United States, which you are particularly familiar with and I am, who has
skilled counsel that try hundreds of cases, or whether it’s the State prosecutor
with his vast experience. It is enough of a fiction to be able to claim that the
ordinary lawyer, with the greatest diligence and skill, is able to present
fairly a case on behalf of a defendant against this skilled prosecutor that’s
had hundreds of cases behind him and understands the reactions of the court, in
addition to knowing right off every case that could have a bearing upon the
question. But when you take the poor layman and put him against those odds,
there isn’t the remotest possibility that you can get a fair trial except by
pure accident.
Now, how does it affect the Federal
situation? In the first place, if you assume that you can’t have a fair trial in
the ordinary case, then I contend that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit
the States to have unfair trials. I don’t think there’d be any question about
that with this Court, any member of this Court.
THE COURT: You’re
talking about the due process clause:
MR. RANKIN: That’s
right.
There is no question but what they—and
you’ve said it time and time—cannot set up a system which provides under that
system for unfair trials.
Now, special circumstance has many
problems that are damaging to the Federal system beyond that. This Court has
struggled with them; it has tried in good faith to apply special circumstance.
And out of the last nine cases where the State courts couldn’t find, since 1942,
special circumstances, this Court has found it six times. Now that doesn’t help
Federal-State relations.
THE COURT: What are
the two cases in which the Court did not find special
circumstances?
MR. RANKIN: Quicksall is one that I recall
particularly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That’s at
339.
MR. RANKIN: Yes,
sir.
THE COURT: And what’s
the other one?
THE COURT: Demilier? Or the-
THE COURT: I can’t
remember any—
MR. RANKIN: Demilier—
THE COURT: I can’t
remember any since I’ve been here—
MR. RANKIN: Yes, there
are two—
THE COURT: I can’t
remember any since I’ve been here where we failed to find special circumstances.
MR. RANKIN: There are
two Pennsylvania cases and a Michigan case, that I recall. One Pennsylvania case
found special circumstances and the other one didn’t. And we have great
difficulty in trying to analyze them to justify the one that didn’t. But the
Court found it—and in the Burke case,
if you will recall, the Court of Appeals of Pennsylvania said that it shouldn’t
have to guess about these matters. It just couldn’t figure out from the Supreme
Court decisions, when one went one way and one went the other, where the special
circumstances law did lie. And it is a very difficult situation. Of course, as
you look toward later years, the Court has quite generally found special
circumstances. But every time that that is done, the States have resented it,
oftentimes because it was done not merely by this Court, but often by a Federal
trial court, United States District Court, which they felt was overruling their
highest appellate court. And all of that is involved in this attack upon the
writ of habeas corpus that has been made from time to time, and the effort
before the Congress to try to limit it. It’s been an abrasive effect and it
hasn’t been fair—
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. RANKIN:
Yes.
THE COURT:
[Inaudible]
MR. RANKIN: Yes. They
have resented the—not only the procedure, but also the difficulty of trying to
determine when special circumstances did lie under this
rule.
Now it also, as we show in our brief, out of 139 cases, the State courts have only been able to find 11 in which they could find any special circumstances of any kind. And it is curious that when there’s as many as have been found by this Court where there were special circumstances out of those that came before it since 1942, that only in 11 out of 139 the State courts could find special circumstances. Now that in itself does not help the situation; but beyond that, when you consider the procedure and the fact that only certain cases come before this Court, only certain cases can possibly get here regarding special circumstances, and by the very nature of things, even though there might have been many of those cases which we didn’t have time to analyze in detail, of the 139 where there were special circumstances that would have satisfied this Court, they did not get here. Now, in order to get here, as Your Honors well know, there has to be an exhaustion of State remedies, and then if it comes here on an appeal or a petition for certiorari it’s different than if it comes here collaterally and the a